

able to deliver on the \$50,000 target for board members (as to which O'Connor fell far short). The significance of O'Connor's various cryptic notations and his approach to McAuliffe on the Hudson issue is heightened in light of Fred Havenick's claim (addressed more fully in Section II.I.2., below) that McAuliffe boasted to Havenick in August 1995 that McAuliffe in fact had helped to "kill" the Hudson application – a claim for which there is no independent corroboration, and which McAuliffe flatly denies.

4. Tribal Opponents Contact the White House, and the White House Contacts Interior

The ultimate focus of the opponents of the Hudson casino proposal was, of course, the decision-makers at the Interior Department. To that end, the opponents sought to exert any pressure they could on those DOI decision makers. By April 1995, the opponents had reached out to senators, congressmen, and the Chairman of the DNC and his Finance staff. In April, the opponents contacted directly the White House and the President himself.

a. Patrick O'Connor's First Attempts to Involve the White House

O'Connor led the opponents' efforts to involve the White House in defeating the Hudson casino proposal.²⁸⁹ O'Connor's first approach to the White House was by telephone on April 7, 1995. He called Loretta Avent, who was Special Assistant to the President for Intergovernmental Affairs. Avent oversaw Indian issues within the Office of Intergovernmental Affairs (OIA).²⁹⁰

²⁸⁹Because Corcoran, the O'Connor & Hannan partner in charge of the St. Croix representation, was a Republican, O'Connor took the lead on lobbying the DNC and the White House.

²⁹⁰The OIA traditionally handled issues concerning municipal and state governments, but in the Clinton Administration the OIA also handled issues concerning Indian tribes. Avent
(continued...)